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A Tale of Sovereignty and Liberalism: 
The Lockean Myth of Intellectual 
Property 
Shaoul Sussman* 
The influence of John Locke’s thought upon the general legal 
perception of property rights cannot be overstated. Locke’s Labor 
theory of property holds that property originally comes about 
through individual exertion upon natural objects and that legal 
rights in the result of this labor are in fact property rights. The 
Lockean theory of property has dominated the Anglo-American 
legal discourse and is frequently used to justify various property 
regulation schemes. Despite this fact, many scholars have struggled 
to apply the theory to the field of intellectual property, and in 
particular to the field of patents and copyright. Many have 
attempted to square the circle, but the results of these efforts are 
rather unpersuasive. 
This Note proposes to introduce a different framework of 
jurisprudence that better explains the underpinnings of the current 
intellectual property legal regime. This framework builds upon and 
applies the Aristocratic concepts of commutative and distributive 
justice to the concept of intellectual property. The Note argues that 
the notion of intellectual property is a legal concept that is first 
delineated by sovereign authorities in an act of commutative justice. 
Only after the ‘rules of the game’ are articulated by the sovereign, 
private actors can enter the legally delineated markets and engage 
in acts of commutative exchange. The Note demonstrates that from 
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its inception, the field of intellectual property was fundamentally a 
sovereign legal endeavor and that despite Locke’s theoretical 
contributions to the field, at no time did the courts of England ever 
applied his own theory to the administration of intellectual property. 
Instead, the courts of England have time and again reaffirmed the 
fact that intellectual property is legal right that is granted by a 
sovereign and is founded upon the principals of distributive justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On September 16, 2011, the America Invents Act (AIA) was 
signed into law with the objective of establishing a more efficient 
and streamlined patent system.1 The AIA’s most significant change 
was the conversion of the United States patent system from a “first-
to-invent” to a “first-inventor-to-file” framework.2 
Theoretically, this law should also apply in the rare event in 
which two scientists are racing simultaneously for years to develop 
an identical cure to the same life-threatening disease while being 
unaware of the other’s laborious progress.3 In this case of accidental 
competition, the patent protection would only be granted to the first 
inventor who successfully filed their invention with the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO).4 It follows that what ultimately 
determines the inventors’ patent rights is not the inventor’s actual 
labor but merely their good fortune: that their application was 
adequate and filed just in time, leaving the other scientist with 
nothing to claim but their shattered ambitions.5 
                                                                                                             
1 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (enacted as the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 125 
Stat. 284, 285–86). 
2 See id. 
3 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 769 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (acknowledging that the AIA first-to-file system puts pressure on companies to 
file early in order to not lose priority). 
4 See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 3 (3d ed. 2013). 
5 See id. 
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What is most surprising perhaps in this rather harsh law is that it 
stands in clear contradiction to Locke’s theory of property—which 
asserts that property is generated and determined by labor.6 
According to Locke’s account, since both inventors came up with 
the same cure at approximately the same time through their 
independent and respective labor, both should be conferred with 
equal patent rights, regardless of the time in which they submitted 
their applications.7 Yet, this view completely undermines the current 
patent system, whose value rests entirely upon the ability to both 
determine and maintain commercial exclusivity.8 Hence, Locke’s 
labor theory cannot help us to explain the foundation of intellectual 
property jurisprudence.9 
The purpose of this Note is not to question the AIA’s validity 
nor that of our prevailing legal doctrines, but rather to challenge its 
current theoretical grounding and to provide a more accurate 
account thereof. This alternative theoretical foundation is by no 
means new10; it can be traced back at least 2,400 years to the 
writings of Aristotle and his division of the administration of justice 
into two basic forms: distributive and commutative.11 According to 
Aristotle, distributive justice concerns the relationship between the 
sovereign body and its individual members.12 It describes the 
process by which rights and legal privileges are distributed by the 
sovereign among the private individuals by the state, according to a 
                                                                                                             
6 See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SECOND TREATISE §§ 27–43, at 
18–27 (Richard H. Cox ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1982) (1690).  
7 See id. 
8 Some “copy-left” advocates argue that this result is preferable in reducing the price 
of technological innovation. See, e.g., Tom G. Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally 
Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 817, 819 (1990). 
9 See Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game 
Theory Justification of Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets, 28 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 833, 833–34 (2018) (acknowledging that Lockean theory faces 
challenges when applied to IP, while other scholars have offered a defense). 
10 See Dr. Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Hidden Though Flourishing Justification of 
Intellectual Property Laws: Distributive Justice, National Versus International 
Approaches, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 335–36 (2017) (proposing that modern 
models of IP, including Lockean theory, fail to consider distributive justice).  
11 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 84–85 (Roger Crisp ed. & trans., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2000) (c. 349 B.C.E.). 
12 See id. 
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common, measurable dispensation scheme.13 By contrast, 
commutative justice is a private type of regulation that orders and 
characterizes the relationship of the individual members of the 
political body amongst themselves.14 This relationship encapsulates 
the commensurable commercial exchange between specific 
individuals and is the basis of all private transactions.15 
The field of intellectual property law adheres to this basic 
Aristotelian division. First, the state provides a particular class of 
individuals (namely inventors) with property rights through 
legislation. Legislation assigns to this class a particular right of 
ownership: the right to exclude all others from introducing or 
offering inventions that are substantially similar and from selling 
goods that embody them.16 Then, the state designates a certain 
period of time for such privigle.17 And lastly, but perhaps most 
importantly, the state provides the inventor with a legal forum to 
prevent others from infringing upon this right during the limited 
period in which their invention is protected by law.18 All of these 
actions represent sovereign acts of “distributive justice” in which the 
state distributes the exclusive rights in a given property to one 
individual and actively precludes all others from using it in any 
unauthorized way.19 
Following this distributive allocation of rights, the sovereign 
allows private individuals to interact freely within this legally 
                                                                                                             
13 See id. 
14 See id. 
15 See THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 2086–90 (Christian Classics 1981) 
(1265–1274). 
16 See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of 
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB POL’Y 593 (2008). 
It is also interesting to note that this designation is also applied by the state in other fields 
such as criminal law. Some possessions such as illicit drugs are not legally recognized as 
property and governments prohibit any type of ownership in these tangible objects. In fact, 
all private citizens are excluded from a right to own this type of object. See id. at 609 n. 61. 
17 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o 
promote the [p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries . . . .”). 
18 See 35 U.S.C. § 146 (2012). 
19 Theories of distributive justice seek to specify what is meant by a just distribution of 
goods among members of society. Brian Duignan, Justice, Social Concept, ENCYC. 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/justice-social-concept [https://perma.cc
/X4ZR-JDJH] (last visited Apr. 16, 2019). 
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established marketplace in accordance with the laws of 
“commutative justice.” Private individuals are allowed to 
voluntarily bargain for the trade of goods. For example, inventors 
may authorize others to embody those inventions in their products, 
adapt them into tangible goods, and use them in any other way 
agreed upon by both parties.20 The current field of intellectual 
property also demonstrates the Aristotelian principle that from a 
procedural prespective distributive justice precedes and facilitates 
commutative justice. Indeed, it is only once the ‘rules of the game’ 
are set and clearly stated (e.g., what constitutes intellectual property; 
the length of time that it is protected; and so on) that individual 
actors can enter the scene and negotiate meaningfully the terms of 
the various relevant exchanges.21 Delineating property rights and 
enforcement are a necessary condition for efficient market 
exchange.22 
By surveying the history of intellectual property in England 
since the invention of the printing press up until the late 18th century, 
this Note demonstrates that the Aristotelian principle not only 
explains our current legal regime but also the regime that existed at 
the time in which Locke articulated his own revisionist theory. 
This Note suggests that Locke’s labor theory was a crucial and 
extremely influential part of an organized theoretical assault upon 
the role of the English absolute monarch in regulating property 
through the legal administration of distributive justice. The three 
main theoretical protagonists in this story are Edward Coke, John 
                                                                                                             
20 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). This provision allows “an assignment, mortgage, 
exclusive license, or any other conveyance, alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or 
of any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time 
or place of effect, but not including a nonexclusive license.” 
21 In the United States, these commutative rights of exchange are carefully delineated 
by statutory law. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text. 
22 It is essential not to conflate this understanding of the law with the traditional 
utilitarian rationale of copyright. Utilitarianism was only first formulated during the late 
18th Century and can be seen as directly criticizing this view. For further reading see 
Quentin Skinner, A Genealogy of Liberty, Presented at Stanford Humanities Center for the 
Harry Camp Memorial Lecture (Oct. 27, 2016), https://cluelesspoliticalscientist
.wordpress.com/2017/01/27/a-genealogy-of-liberty-by-quentin-skinner-lecture-transcript/ 
[https://perma.cc/CDU2-5H3D]. 
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Locke and William Blackstone.23 Each of the three sought to 
contribute to, and thereby further consolidate his predecessors’ 
attempt to formulate a theory of property that severed the well 
established connection between sovereignty and commerce or better 
still: between state regulation and private interest. 
Intellectual property jurisprudence proved to be a particularly 
thorny issue for these thinkers. For unlike land or chattel, which 
conformed rather nicely into the liberal myth of common law 
property, both Locke and Blackstone recognized the difficulty in 
explaining intellectual property by relying only upon the vocabulary 
of commutative justice. Each contemporary attempt to conform 
intellectual property to their views was met with great practical 
difficulties and the theoretical barriers which had to be overcome 
are charted in detail.24 The most disquieting conclusion that this 
Note makes is that despite all of these theoretical and concrete 
failures, Locke’s and Blackstone’s view ultimately won the day and 
became the orthodox dogma in the field of intellectual property law 
thoery. This is especially surprising given the fact that their theory 
was never adopted by the courts of law nor applies to present day 
legal practice. This historical schism produced a pronounced 
dissonance between legal theory and practice which is apparent to 
this day and which, further, suggests that at times illusory legal 
ideology can exist alongside the actual law. 
Part I of this Note reviews the historical development of rights 
in copies in England from 1455 up until 1688. It illustrates how 
Absolutism and later populism played a pivotal role in shaping the 
actual structure of copyright law to this day.25 In particular, the fact 
that rights in copies were accurately regarded as a sovereign grant 
                                                                                                             
23 Edward Coke was an English barrister, judge and member of the English Parliament 
(1552–1634). Gareth H. Jones, Sir Edward Coke, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Coke [https://perma.cc/SS9H-8NA8] (last 
updated Aug. 30, 2018). John Locke was an English philosopher and physician (1632–
1704). Graham A.J. Rogers, John Locke, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/biography/John-Locke [https://perma.cc/CY9E-D644] (last updated Oct. 24, 2018) . 
William Blackstone was an English barrister and judge (1723–1780). Sir William 
Blackstone, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/William-
Blackstone [https://perma.cc/U89E-P3VQ] (last updated July 6, 2018). 
24 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 9, at 33–34. 
25 See generally PETER W. M. BLAYNEY, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY AND THE PRINTERS 
OF LONDON, 1501–57 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013). 
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of exclusive dispensation of rights over a given literary work. This 
view of rights in copies was also entirely consistent with the overall 
legal perception of property during that time.26 
In Part II, this Note traces the growing influence of Locke’s 
labor theory alongside the gradual demise of the royal prerogative 
and explains how these processes influenced copyright law in the 
late Seventeenth century. Locke’s theory argued that role of 
government is to protect “natural” private property from wrongful 
usurpation.27 This vision of government was held as antithetical to 
the notion that the state should be charged with the dispensation of 
property rights through the administration of distributive justice. In 
addition, Locke’s ontological account of property deliberately 
obscured the sovereign-distributive framework of property by 
suggesting that property is exclusively established and shaped 
through commutative justice. This Part also charts Locke’s 
historical lobbying efforts in the field of intellectual property law 
and the way he sought to reconcile the abstract principles of his 
universal theory with actual legal regulation. In line with previous 
research, it is argued that the substance of Locke’s proposal in the 
field of intellectual property clearly contradicted his abstract 
theoretical conception of property. 
Part III of this Note surveys the Battle of the Booksellers. It is 
viewed in a wider context that considers the influence of sovereignty 
theory and distributive justice upon the field of intellectual property 
law. By this time, Coke’s and Locke’s views on property penetrated 
the legal discipline to such an extent that despite the inability to 
apply their views to legal practice, not a single member of the Court 
of Chancery or the House of Lords including William Blackstone 
had disputed the soundness of their theory. 
The conclusion suggests that from a general theoretical 
standpoint, William Blackstone’s role in fortifying Locke’s 
scholarly legacy is reflected in the current general acceptance of the 
commutative theory of intellectual property.28 This acceptance is 
                                                                                                             
26 Id. 
27 LOCKE, supra note 6, § 27, at 306. 
28 An exception in this respect is the outstanding contribution of Laura R. Ford. In her 
work she argues that “[i]ntellectual property is thus a creature of the nation-state, just as 
much for Eighteenth Century Britain, as for the United States and France” and that “the 
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manifested in the academic engagement with Locke’s work which 
has only increased in the last twenty-five years.29 In particular, both 
proponents and critics of Locke’s thinking accept the notion that the 
role of intellectual property law is to balance the commutative rights 
of individuals in their property against the rights of others.30 Even 
Locke’s most staunch critics do not question the theoretical validity 
of his direct attack on the role of sovereign distributive dispensation 
in intellectual property law.31 The conclusion of this Note also bears 
some practical suggestions: (1) further research should focus upon 
how sovereign frameworks informed the formation of legal rights in 
other fields of property and, (2) Eighteenth century English 
jurisprudence should play a lesser role in shaping our current 
understanding of American intellectual property law. 
I. THE HISTORICAL ORIGIN OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
A. The Scope of Sovereign Authority and Royal Prerogative 
Under the Rule of Henry VIII 
As opposed to the political and commercial situation in Locke’s 
time, both Parliament, the common law courts, and commerce courts 
in the beginning of the Sixteenth century were in practice subjected 
to the ultimate sovereign will of the king. Within this constitutional 
scheme, it was the role of the courts of common law to enforce the 
royal laws against crimes and to adjudicate civil disputes.32 The 
                                                                                                             
Prerogative tradition implicitly excluded the ‘Lockean’ natural law argument.” Laura R. 
Ford, Prerogative, Nationalized: The Social Formation of Intellectual Property, 97 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 270, 304–05 (2015). 
29 See Lior Zemer, The Making of a New Copyright Lockean, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 891, 892 (2006). 
30 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives 
Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75 (2004); see also Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1998). 
31 See Benjamin G. Damstedt, Note, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the 
Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1181 (2003). Zemer claims that Locke’s lobbying 
efforts in the field indicate that he was concerned with balancing the rights of individuals 
with the common good. If adopted at face value, this argument further supports the notion 
that Locke’s theory and political practice are squarely at odds. Zemer, supra note 29, at 
895. 
32 See PHILIP EDWARDS, THE MAKING OF THE MODERN ENGLISH STATE, 1460–1660, at 
216–19 (2001). 
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exact hierarchal organization of these courts was contested at times, 
but despite their seemingly arbitrary positioning within the general 
legal structure, all of these courts were formally overseen and 
sanctioned exclusively by the king.33 Officially, the king was 
considered as the ‘author’ of the common law. This notion was 
reinforced by the careful historical documentation of the fact that 
the English judiciary was a creation of Henry II and that his judges 
were directly dependent on the king, in whose name they dispensed 
justice.34 The king also retained his historical privilege to decide any 
case that was brought before the courts, although actual direct 
sovereign intervention was infrequent.35 
With regards to property rights, the king, as in the days of Henry 
II, retained his formal position as the sole allodial owner of land in 
England, despite the ever-increasing control of private entities over 
land possessions and a general lack of respect to medieval legal 
traditions.36 The king and his appointed agents were in charge of the 
dispensation of property rights. The highest form of property right, 
as in the days of William the Conqueror, remained the possession of 
fiefs or rights in fee simple, and property disputes were resolved by 
the king’s judges in the various royal courts of common law.37 Of 
particular importance for this Note, the king was also entitled to 
create royal patents and construct monopolies in certain fields of 
commerce or upon certain industries such as mining.38 
                                                                                                             
33 See George Burton Adams, Origin of the English Courts of Common Law, 30 YALE 
L.J. 798, 802 (1921). 
34 See RALPH V. TURNER, THE ENGLISH JUDICIARY IN THE AGE OF GLANVILL AND 
BRACTON C. 1176–1239, at 25–39 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1985). 
35 See DAVID CHAN SMITH, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE REFORMATION OF THE LAWS: 
RELIGION, POLITICS, AND JURISPRUDENCE, 1578–1616, at 16–18 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2014). 
36 See E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System Under the Prerogative and 
at Common Law, 46 THE L. Q. REV. 141, 144 (1896). 
37 See COLIN KIDD, SUBVERTING SCOTLAND’S PAST: SCOTTISH WHIG HISTORIANS AND 
THE CREATION OF AN ANGLO-BRITISH IDENTITY, 1689– C.1830, at 131–34 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2003). 
38 See generally Adams, supra note 33. Allodial is a legal construct that refers to the 
ultimate owner of a given property item. See G. E. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of 
Property in Seventeenth Century England, 86 PAST & PRESENT 87, 87–89 (1980). 
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B. Copyright Law Under the Rule of King Henry VIII 
Modern printing was introduced to London during the 1470s and 
ever since then, the English book trade was subject to some kind of 
sovereign oversight.39 From 1487 every form of printed material 
could potentially undergo sovereign inspection in which its content 
was examined and at times censored if it was deemed to contain 
materials that were considered by the censors as heretical or 
treasonous.40 By the time Henry VIII assumed the throne, a number 
of medieval guilds were engaged in the business of book printing.41  
The first chronicled interest in some form of copyright 
protection emerged during the early years of Henry VII’s reign.42 
Unlike manuscripts, which were produced upon demand and in 
small quantities, book printing involved a significant initial 
investment of capital in order to produce a book template.43  
This financial risk was compounded with another new 
commercial risk: unwarranted mechanical book copying. 
Traditionally, qualitative differences which were readily apparent in 
hand-written manuscripts suppressed book pirating on a commercial 
scale.44 However, with the introduction of the printing machine, 
such qualitative differences were suddenly less noticeable. As a 
result, the unwarranted copying of the content of books became a 
far more lucrative endeavor that posed a real commercial risk for 
book printers.45 
In light of these new threats, publishers actively sought for 
means by which they could protect their investment.46 As a result, a 
series of royal grants were instituted by Henry VII’s court in order 
to ensure the economic viability of this newly introduced trade.47 
                                                                                                             
39 See Ian Gadd, The Stationers’ Company in England Before 1710, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT LAW 81, 81–82 (Isabella Alexander & H. 
Tomás Gómez-Arostegui eds., 2016) [hereinafter Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710]. 
40 Id at 82. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 86. 
43 Id. at 82. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 83. 
1368    FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1357 
 
This rather trivial royal decree marks a significant moment in 
the development of intellectual property law. From its inception, it 
became clear to all the interests involved that the book printing 
business could not rely only upon the rudimentary protection of the 
‘commutative’ common law.48 Such protection would be limited 
only to the actual book manuscripts and would therefore afford 
little-to-no economic security to the book printers. In light of this, 
since its legal conception it was clear that official sovereign 
intervention was essential in establishing a viable market in 
copyrights.49 Consequently, the early royal printing privileges in 
copies were designed to provide real protection, albeit, by a 
somewhat cumbersome and ineffective bureaucratic authority.50 In 
practice, this protection was brought about by a sovereign decision 
to actively preclude all but one printer from printing a given book. 
Remarkable as it may seem, even at this very early stage the book 
printing industry relied upon a distinct form of distributive law that 
regulated property rights in the infant industry.51 Thus, even during 
its initial stages, intellectual property, like other forms of goods or 
chattels, essentially owed its actual commercial viability to the 
distributive legal mechanism of the Crown and its courts of law.52 
Hence, and similarly to other fields of the law, it seemed prefectly 
normal to exercise distributive law in other fields of commerce such 
as the granting of various trade monopolies.53 
By the mid 1520s, over half of the active printers in England 
obtained some form of royal privilege for their works and by the late 
1530s, over a third of all the books that were printed in London 
maintained some sort of derivative royal protection.54 The 
prevalence of such printing privileges was ever growing but 
nonetheless remained entirely voluntary.55 Typically, sovereign 
protection was extended to a printer or a book after a petition to the 
                                                                                                             
48 Id. at 87. 
49 Id. at 87–88. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See M. Frumkin, The Origin of Patents, 27 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 143, 144–45 (1945). 
54 See BLAYNEY, supra note 25, at 322–26. 
55 In fact, more than two thirds of the books printed in London were unprotected by 
privilege. Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710, supra note 39, at 83–85. 
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Crown was made by the individual who sought protection.56 As 
historians have observed, these royal privileges were simply a grant 
of temporary commercial monopoly and by no means translated into 
an official royal endorsement of the book’s actual content.57 
In practice, Henry VIII’s court failed to develop an actual legal 
enforcement mechanism to protect the privileges it granted and this 
fact rendered the issuance of royal privilege less and less 
meaningful.58 But despite these issues of enforcement, up until 
1510, the young book printing market required minimal legal 
protection and sovereign regulation.59 This was due to the fact that 
the entire printing industry was in the process of initial expansion 
and its members were still limited in number.60 Moreover, 
infringement was uncommon because printing privileges were 
inherently temporary and even if the king at times granted a specific 
printer a ‘perpetual privilege,’that privilege was extended until 
either the printer’s or king’s death.61 Even in the rare cases of actual 
infringement, the printer whose work was copied had to litigate his 
case in the Court of Chancery—a costly affair which further deterred 
actual litigation.62 
C. The Influence of the ‘Absolutist’ State Theory upon the English 
Constitutional Scheme 
Under Henry VIII’s rule, England was a politically turbulent 
society. Henry’s religious reform led to substantial clashes with the 
English clergy and other political actors that swore their allegiance 
to the Pope.63 In other parts of Europe, the Protestant reformation 
resulted in outbreaks of religious wars that greatly threatened a 
number of well-established continental monarchies.64 
                                                                                                             
56 Id. 
57 While the printing privilege of the book was protected, the content of it was not, and 
it was entirely possible for a book printer to be prosecuted for the unlawful content that 
was contained in his privileged copy. Id at 84. 
58 See Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710, supra note 39 at 86. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 See G. R. ELTON, REFORM AND REFORMATION: ENGLAND, 1509–1588, at 103–07 
(Arnold Publ. 1977). 
64 Id. at 15–18. 
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This period of unprecedented geopolitical instability gave birth 
to the first early-modern monarchist state theory.65 This political 
theory, which is termed by historians as “Absolutist state theory,” is 
generally attributed to the French jurist Jean Bodin (1530-1596) and 
is found in his seminal theoretical work ‘Les Six Livres de la 
République’ (1576).66 Bodin argued that any political body or state 
is, in fact, a union of people under the same sovereignty or 
government.67 In essence, a state is a particular type of civil 
association in which a mass of individuals is united in their 
subjection to a ruling group.68 Bodin pointed out that in most cases 
this ruling class is consistent of a monarch which is described as a 
“head of state,” but in his treatises, Bodin admitted that sovereign 
power could be held by the people themselves such as in the ancient 
polity of Athens.69 Bodin nonetheless insisted that a strong natural 
preference existed for the establishment of monarchical regimes 
over any other form of government.70 
The second contribution of the Absolutist theory was to 
galvanize the metaphor of the king’s two bodies.71 In opposition to 
medieval understandings of monarchy that identified the king as a 
temporary wielder of sovereign power, the Absolutists held that any 
monarch has two bodies.72 The first body was of course the corporal 
person that was designated as king.73 The second body was that of 
the eternal and ideal legal person of the monarch.74 The implications 
                                                                                                             
65 See Quentin Skinner, The Sovereign State: A Genealogy, in SOVEREIGNTY IN 
FRAGMENTS: THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF A CONTESTED CONCEPT 28–30 (Hent 
Kalmo & Quentin Skinner eds., 2010) [hereinafter Skinner, Genealogy]. 
66 As opposed to the feudal conception of monarchy which rooted the king’s privileges 
and allodial possessions in divine right, Absolutist thinkers like Bodin sought to trace the 
legal origins of monarchical rule and justify them on the grounds of Aristotelian and 
Ciceronian principles of political philosophy. See JULIAN H. FRANKLIN, JEAN BODIN AND 
THE RISE OF ABSOLUTIST THEORY 85–92 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1973). 
67 See JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 156–72 
(CreateSpace 2009) (1576). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Quentin Skinner, The Body of the State, in IMAGINING THE STATE 16–17 (Mark 
Neocleous, 2003) [hereinafter Skinner, The Body]. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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of this distinction might seem trivial at first, but they denote a 
significant milestone in the development of political and 
constitutional theory.75 In feudal thought, the death of a king marked 
a point of sovereign crisis in which multiple political actors and 
factions came to assert their right to assume the throne.76 
Additionally, the death of a king also marked a period of juridical 
instability. By distinguishing between the king’s corporal existence 
and the king’s legal person, Absolutist thinkers sought to stabilize 
the process of monarchial succession and ensure legal stability upon 
the king’s death.77 
D. ‘Absolutism’ and Property Rights 
In medieval England the monarch’s allodial ownership over 
property was granted to each of its kings in their coronation 
ceremony in accordance with the principles of primogeniture 
hereditary succession.78 As a result, the ascendance to the throne of 
a new monarch also marked a period of significant property 
redistribution in accordance with the will of the newly anointed 
sovereign.79 The formal justification for these acts of political 
redistribution was that the Kings of England held a legal royal 
dominion over all of the kingdom’s lands and property. In fact, the 
king held the titles of all actual personal ownership of that property 
and could determine who were his tenants. Consequently, all land 
grants, patents, and royal court appointments or any other legal 
permits that constituted acts of distributive justice were, in feudal 
                                                                                                             
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 See Aylmer, supra note 38, at 87–89. 
79 For example, the Act for the Dissolution of the Lesser Monasteries (1536) which was 
enacted by Parliament in the reign of Henry VIII to transfer English Papal properties in to 
the hands of the Church of England stated that “his majesty shall have (these properties) 
and enjoy to him and his heirs forever.” In other words, the kings’ rights over the Papal 
property emanated from the fact that he was the lawful heir of the lands of England. This 
act was legitimate because the king retained a right of entry as a grantor who has the legal 
power of termination if a condition is violated and the grantor decides to reclaim the estate. 
See Suppression of Religious Houses Act 1535, 27 HEN. 8 c.28 (Eng.). 
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times, limited to the life of the king and were subsequently 
automatically revoked upon his death.80   
In light of this inherent commercially unstable reality, the 
adoption of the Absolutist theory by the English Crown during the 
1550s had momentous ramifications. The influence of this 
sovereignty theory upon the legal tradition of common law property 
became immediately apparent. In contrast with medieval legal 
theory, the Absolutist view held that the king, as the sole legitimate 
head, both practically and figuratively, of the state was the lawful 
allodial owner of all the land that belongs to it.81 Hence, the king’s 
legal rights over the land of the state did not stem from his historical 
factual possession of the land or alternatively, due to his corporal 
hereditary inheritance, but rather from his authoritarian powers as 
the head of the state.82 In accordance with this theory, even if the 
king’s successor does not actually possess rights of primogeniture, 
he was nonetheless the rightful owner of the crown’s properties by 
attaining the legal position of head of state.83 In more abstract terms, 
if in medieval England distributive justice was in fact redefined and 
redistributed with each royal succession, in renaissance England, the 
role of distributing justice was removed from the direct perview of 
the actual corporal monarch and was subsequently assigned to the 
king, as the head of the English state. This change allowd for greater 
stability in the field of distributive justice and facilitated a more 
independent sphere of commutative transactions. 
The emergence of the Absolutist theory also provides a better 
understanding of the gradual yet significant changes in the status of 
sovereign authority over the judiciary and the lands of England that 
occurred in the first half of the Sixteenth century. During the first 
few decades of Henry VIII’s reign sovereign authority seemed to 
emanate from the king’s own royal heritage;84 however, by the end 
of his reign during the 1550s, the king and royal sovereignty came 
to be perceived in a different light.85 The right of kings was still 
                                                                                                             
80 See HOWARD NENNER, THE RIGHT TO BE KING: THE SUCCESSION TO THE CROWN OF 
ENGLAND, 1603–1714, at 7–10 (MacMillan Press 1995). 
81 See Aylmer, supra note 38, at 87–89. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84   WEIR, supra note 72, at 21. 
85 See Skinner, The Body, supra note 69, at 12–15. 
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justified as a divine one, but the legal conception of monarchy had 
developed.86 Henry was no longer only the sole rightful owner of 
the lands of England but also the ‘head of the English State’ and his 
sovereign legitimacy emanated from his role as the head of the 
English body politic and not from his actual ownership of its lands.87 
E. The Effect of ‘Absolutism’ on Rights in Copies in the Second 
Half of the Sixteenth Century 
The Absolutist theory also had a significant impact on the book 
trade, although its real effects became apparent only after the death 
of Henry VIII’s son Edward VI in 1553. In fact, it was the 
subsequent ascendance of Mary to the throne and the counter 
movement of the Court from Protestantism to Catholicism that 
brought about this change.88 Within the first year of Queen Mary’s 
reign, over half of the printers of London lost their printing rights, 
while only a handful of privileges were either renewed or created 
due to the Catholic ‘restoration’ that was taking place.89 After a four-
year period of legal vacillation, violent purges, and the general 
uncertainty among the members of the London book trade, the 
Catholic-leaning Stationers’ Company emerged as the dominant 
entity in the realm of book printing.90 In 1557, Queen Mary decided 
to grant the company an almost monopolistic right over book 
printing.91 The grant stipulated that every owner of a printing press 
in England must be a member of the Stationers’ Company unless he 
was granted a direct superseding privilege from the monarch 
himself.92 The grant transformed the Stationers’ Company from a 
medieval guild to the de-facto regulator of the English book trade.93 
                                                                                                             
86   Id.  
87 Id. 
88 See BLAYNEY, supra note 25, at 756–58. 
89 Id. 
90 See Royal Charter of the Company of Stationers (1557), reprinted in 1 A TRANSCRIPT 
OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF LONDON xxx-xxxi (Edward Arber 
ed., 1950), available at http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cam/tools/request/showRecord
.php?id=record_uk_1557 [https://perma.cc/XA8E-79TM]. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
1374    FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1357 
 
The Royal Charter of 1557 delegated the sovereign power of 
‘privilege granting’ exclusively to the Stationers’ Company.94 This 
act resulted in the transformation of the Stationers’ Company into a 
quasi-administrative agency of the Crown.95 This delegation was 
further reinforced by the fact that the new privileges were granted 
on behalf of the company but were legally enforced by the Crown’s 
Courts. This seemingly minor formal alteration in the title of the 
granting authority might seem trivial, but it had a significant impact. 
Privileges were no longer granted by a mortal person and therefore 
limited to the duration of a king’s life, but rather by a royally-
sanctioned corporation.96 Thus, while sovereigns come and go, and 
while the individual members of the company continuously joined 
and eventually died, the company as a royally incorporated entity 
was designed to endure. It could therefore grant privileges and 
enforce legal obligations or rights far beyond the lifetime of any of 
its individual members.97 Subsequently, the company could secure 
in perpetuity the rights of its members in book copies.98 This 
commercial stability stood in stark contrast with the old property 
regime that was subject to the will of an idiosyncratic and transient 
monarch. In abstract terms, this process can be seen as an attempt to 
buttress the manner in which distributive justice dispenses privilege. 
If we examine these changes from a sovereign perspective, the 
Royal Charter of 1557 can be seen as the establishment of an entirely 
new regime in the field of copyright. Although the Crown itself 
became once removed from the formal process of granting rights, 
the de-facto authority and control that the royal prerogative exerted 
over the domestic book trade through the royally-sanctioned 
Stationers’ Company was stronger than ever.99 In a practical sense, 
the dispensation of distributive justice in the field of copyright 
became insulated from the turbulent political reality of Sixteenth 
                                                                                                             
94 See id.  
95 See Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710, supra note 39, at 88. 
96 Id. 
97 See John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE 
L.J. 655 (1926); see also Arthur Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253 
(1911). 
98 See Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710, supra note 39, at 92–93. 
99 See id. at 88–90. In terms of its function within the sovereign scheme, the company 
can be compared to the function of the USPTO. 
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century England. This was achieved by entrusting this dispensation 
procedure in the hands of a quasi-administrative professional body 
that had a vested interest in promoting the commercial viability of 
the book printing business. 
Any prior rights in copies which were obtained before the 
Charter were rendered invalid.100 The Queen vested the Stationers’ 
Company with exclusive authority over the registration of copies 
and arbitration of property disputes between the individual owners 
of those rights.101 Most importantly, the legal right in copies was not 
limited to the life of the owner (in a life estate), or to a limited 
duration (in an estate for years) but was granted as a fee simple.102 
In short, the Charter was structured in light of a new vision of 
monarchical rule and consequently, of distributive justice.103 
Since all printing houses effectively became members of the 
company, the company had to develop a way to mediate the various 
competing interests of its numerous commercial stakeholders. To 
achieve this goal, the company instated a fundamental rule that 
would eventually become a hallmark of intellectual property: the 
registration of copies.104 Each member of the company that wished 
to publish a book had to visit the Stationers’ Hall to register their 
rights in the copy.105 In a similar manner to the grant of royal 
privileges under King Henry VIII, the company did not peruse the 
nature or content of the work and its decision to allow registration 
was purely based on commercial considerations.106 The Stationers’ 
Company simply granted a trade privilege and the printer was 
expected to seek printing authorization for his book from the 
ecclesiastic and political authorities who were permitted by the 
Queen to license these works.107 
Registration offered a monopoly over the copy and, to a certain 
extent, over its content.108 Registration also allowed any printer to 
                                                                                                             
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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104 Id. 
105 Id. at 88.  
106 See SMITH, supra note 35, at 168–74. 
107 See Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710, supra note 39, at 88–90. 
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inquire in advance whether the book he was planning to print was 
already registered and more crucially, to validate his printing rights 
in case of a dispute with another printer.109 The Royal Charter of 
1557 also established an internal bureaucratic system to oversee the 
process of copy registration, to facilitate transactions among the 
members of the company and to arbitrate between disputing 
printers.110 Clerks and wardens were assigned to monitor these tasks 
and their operations were fully funded by the registration fees that 
were collected from the individual members upon the registration of 
their copies.111 All of these administrative mechanisms were 
introduced in order to facilitate and regulate the commutative 
voluntary exchange of goods between private merchants in the 
newly established copyright market.112 
F. The Routine Function of Copy Registration in 
Elizabethan England 
After the grant of the Charter, the Stationers’ Company 
effectively became a printer’s guild.113 Every printer who sought 
permission to print a book had to register their copy by entering the 
Stationers’ Hall and presenting the book to one of the Stationers’ 
wardens.114 The warden’s task was to determine if the submitted 
work would trespass upon the pre-registered rights of another 
copy.115 In reaching this determination, the warden had to evaluate 
whether the newly submitted copy was, in fact, an act of piracy— 
the printing of a registered copy without authorization.116 If the copy 
was deemed worthy of registration, the clerk would make an entry 
in the register as well as in the procedural notebook of the clerk.117 
The printer had to pay the clerk’s fee and received a receipt in the 
form of a parchment that ensured his registration.118 
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110 Id. 
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113 See Graham Pollard, The Early Constitution of the Stationers’ Company, 18 LIBRARY 
235, 242–43 (1937). 
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In this context, a second important distinction must be made: 
entry in the register was not necessary to enable printing and 
publication, and only safeguarded the right in the copy and allowed 
the possibility of judicial relief.119 The registration of a copy in fact, 
did not create the chattel itself; that is, the actual manuscript and no 
such sort of legal fiction was ever recognized or endorsed. Instead, 
certification granted access to sovereign remedial justice.120 The act 
of registration was considered as a contract in which the printer pays 
a registration fee in exchange for sovereign protection and a 
guarantee that the courts of law will recognize a cause of action and 
will police the rights in the copy in a case of pirating.121 Most 
notably, this right in property was in fee simple and could also be 
conveyed to another or even mortgaged, similarly to any other form 
of common law property.122 
G. The Legal Jurisdiction of the Stationers’ Bench 
Since the Stationers’ Company had a de facto monopoly upon 
the creation of rights in copies and in facilitating the exchange of 
property rights in publications among its members, it naturally 
followed that this Company was also endowed with some judicial 
authority, namely, in resolving ownership disputes.123 This dispute 
resolution procedure was administered by the Stationers’ Bench, a 
quasi-juridical body that consisted of distinguished members of the 
company as well as its chief wardens.124 In cases of disputed 
ownership, it was the duty of the moving party, a stationer alleging 
the equivalent of modern-day infringement, to provide the Bench 
                                                                                                             
119 See Id. 
120 Interestingly, the wardens did permit the ‘pirating’ of copies which were not registered 
in the Stationers’ Register, since copies of non-member printers were not considered as 
entitled for legal protection. Rights in copies could only be established through a sovereign 
grant of these rights. Therefore, in essence, any right to a copy could only be achieved 
through registration in the Stationers’ Register or by a direct act of the Court. This practice 
might seem unjust or egregious to the contemporary observer, but it is important to 
remember that the notion of property rights was intrinsically connected to sovereignty. See 
Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710, supra note 39, at 89. 
121 Id. 
122 This distinction was not unheard of in Sixteenth Century English law or foreign to 
English printers. See Feather, supra note 113, at 464–66. 
123 Id. at 244–48. 
124 Id. 
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with evidence that they owned the disputed copy, the correlated 
license to print it, and a valid registration of the copy in the 
Stationers’ Register.125 The vast majority of cases were relatively 
simple. Any printer that attempted to print or register a copy that 
was already in the register could be brought in front of the 
Stationers’ Bench and held accountable for his infringement.126 In 
simple cases the members of the bench only had to review the 
clerk’s minutes of the original registration and decide the case after 
the opposing parties presented their oral argument.127 This system 
was extremely efficient and practical because the bench had 
immediate access to self-authenticating evidence of ownership of 
copy in the form of the Stationers’ Register which served as 
undisputed proof of valid ownership. In addition to its quasi-judicial 
role in resolving ownership disputes, the Company was tasked with 
the daily administrative role of overseeing the assignment and 
transfer of the ownership in copies from one stationer to another.128 
This transactional procedure was procedurally similar to the 
registration of a new copy and the transaction itself was sanctioned 
and deemed valid only if it was overseen by one of the Company’s 
wardens which was tasked with making an official revision of the 
original ownership entry in the register record.129 
From a theoretical perspective, the Company created a legally 
sanctioned procedural framework that facilitated both private 
transactions between the individual members of the Company and 
an effective enforcement mechanism that secured the property rights 
of these members in their copies. In essence, the entire registry 
system was designed to ensure the voluntary exchange of 
commensurable goods between two private individuals.130 This 
regulatory framework also explains the severe prohibition that 
existed in those days to transfer these rights to copies without 
official Company oversight. This prohibition not only served as a 
measure that prevented nefarious acts such as the involuntary 
                                                                                                             
125 See C. J. Sisson, The Laws of Elizabethan Copyright: The Stationers’ View, 15 THE 
LIBR. 8, 10–11 (1960). 
126 Id. at 10. 
127 Id. at 18. 
128 Id. at 15–16. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 15, 18. 
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exchange of property between individual members of the Company, 
but more fundamentally ensured that all individual transactions were 
both commensurable and voluntary.131 
H. Appealing to the Court of Chancery and the Private Transfer  
of Rights 
In rare cases, disputes could be appealed from the Stationers’ 
Bench to the Court of Chancery.132 The benefit of appealing to the 
Court of Chancery, apart from getting a second chance at prevailing 
in the suit, was that intrinsic evidence could be introduced into the 
record in order to question the Stationers’ Bench prior decision.133 
Such intrinsic evidence could potentially undermine the Company’s 
records or establish a remedy in cases of irregularities in the 
registration procedure. 
Modern research has discovered a number of cases from the 
Elizabethan period which have been pursued in the Court of 
Chancery.134 One of these cases serves as a good illustration of the 
complex nature of these disputes. It involved an attempt to transfer 
the right in a copy of one stationer to another privately and without 
the Stationers’ authority by bypassing the official process of 
registering the transaction in the Company’s register according to 
standard procedure.135 Although one can only speculate, it seems 
that the primary motivation for this illicit transfer had to do with the 
nature of the intended transfer. As was previously noted, rights in 
copies were granted in the form of fee simple property and remained 
in the exclusive possession of the printer until his death, upon which, 
the copy along with the rest of his inheritance was transferred to his 
beneficiaries.136 The printer could alternatively transfer his rights in 
the copy to another printer but such action amounted to complete 
                                                                                                             
131 Id. at 14. 
132 In such infrequent events, the Court of Assistants, a specialty court that dealt 
exclusively with matters of trade and commerce and which was comprised of members 
from the major guilds and companies of London, would meet in the Court of Chancery to 
provide expert guidance to the judges in the laws of copying and pirating. See LYMAN RAY 
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 29–34 (Vand. Univ. Press 1968). 
133 Id. at 34. 
134 See, e.g., Sisson, supra note 125, at 9. The unreported case in the article is named 
Barnes v. Man (1616–1617). Id. at 10. 
135 Id. at 10. 
136 See Gadd, Stationers’ Before 1710, supra note 39, at 89. 
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alienation that foreclosed any possibility of reverter or “term of 
years” transfer.137 In light of these restrictions, the attempted private 
transfer that was documented in this specific case can be understood 
as an attempt to undermine the Stationers’ system by limiting the 
transfer itself to a specified amount of printed copies. In other words, 
the original owner of the copy granted another printer the right to 
print a limited amount of copies in exchange for a sum of money 
without giving up his rights in it. This transaction could be equated 
to a modern license in patent. It remains unclear why such licensing 
was itself forbidden, but it seems that it emanated from a concern 
that such a license would lessen the future value of the copy due to 
excessive printing. 
Another potential motivation of the parties in the case was 
perhaps to avoid the payment of the transfer fee which was imposed 
by the Stationers’ warden upon the parties when they registered the 
transfer of rights in the Stationers’ Hall.138 In other words, the 
private contract might have been a simple attempt to circumvent the 
Company’s regulations. 
Notwithstanding the contracting parties’ original motivation, the 
suit which was brought by them against the Stationers’ Company 
was transformed by their counsel into a full-fledged attempt to 
challenge the prevailing notion that the assignment of copies was a 
public transaction that had to be supervised by the Company and 
required the Company’s agreement for an absolute transfer of the 
copy.139 In essence, the suit attempted to establish the equitable 
validity of a private contract between two voluntary contracting 
parties despite the lack of official documentation and procedure. In 
a more theoretical sense, the appealing party questioned the 
distributive authority which was bestowed upon the Stationers’ 
Company by a royal grant to delineate the legal contours of the 
private commutative exchange of rights in book copies. 
The reasoning of the court in dismissing this suit is noteworthy 
because it further elucidates the relationship between sovereignty 
and property during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In 
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139 Id. at 19. 
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its decision, the court reiterated the notion that any two parties are 
free to contract in order to transfer ownership in property.140 
However, this right is limited and circumscribed if the property in 
question enjoys any sovereign protection in regulation.141 Therefore, 
if the copy was never registered in the Company’s Register, there 
may be no restriction on the assignment of copy.142 But from the 
moment the printer decided of his own accord to register his copy in 
the Stationers’ Register, he entered into a binding contract with the 
Company (with the registration fee as consideration).143 The 
contract endowed the printer with an exclusive monopoly right in 
the copy and in exchange the company was granted the sole 
authority to oversee and police the author’s rights in the property.144 
In other words, the Court did not question the ability of two parties 
to contract freely in order to transfer goods but denied the ability of 
two parties to contract in order to transfer rights. Theoretically, the 
Court asserted that the commutative rights that existed in registered 
book copies was intrinsically dependent upon the sovereignly 
sanctioned distributive mechanisms that facilitated this type of 
commutative exchange in the first place. 
In light of this decision, the second and private agreement 
between the printers violated the terms of the initial contract 
between the printer and the company. The decision highlights the 
assertion that the royal courts did not perceive the Company as the 
creator of the property right in the tangible manuscript itself but 
rather as the creator and facilitator of a market for copies.145 
                                                                                                             
140 Id. at 16–19. 
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143 Patterson argues that “ . . . the stationers owned only the right to publish, not the work 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND THE SHIFTING CONCEPTION OF 
RIGHTS IN PROPERTY 
A. The Demise of ‘Absolutism’ and the Rise of Populism 
In the early 1600s, England gradually sank into a constitutional 
crisis that would eventually result in the regicide of 1648.146 
Mounting pressure from both Parliament and the judiciary limited 
the scope of monarchical sovereignty by questioning the supremacy 
of the king and his divine or absolutist right.147 As part of this effort, 
the absolutist theory of sovereignty also came under direct attack. In 
Parliament, a growing number of members questioned the 
theoretical basis that justified the king’s supremacy over the court 
by developing a new ‘populist’ theory of the state.148 At the same 
time, judges and legal theorists disputed the royal origins of the 
English common law.149 
Both efforts would also have a significant influence on the laws 
of copyright and the fate of the Stationers’ Company. The advocates 
of Parliamentarian supremacy would eventually transfer the 
authority to police the rights in copies and patents from the Crown 
to Parliament by the 1660s and the proponents of judicial 
independence would reject the validity of the contracts which were 
created in the name of the king in the ensuing century.150 This 
dramatic shift in political authority eventually reconfigured the field 
of copyright law into a system that resembles to a great extent the 
framework of contemporary intellectual property jurisprudence. 
B. Judicial Jurisdiction and the Royal Prerogative 
The first significant legal critique of the Crown was levied by 
Sir Edward Coke in the early decades of the 17th century. As Chief 
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Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, Coke rejected the notion that 
the king was entitled to decide cases that were brought before the 
court.151 Coke also claimed that it was the common law that 
protected the king and not the king that defended the common 
law.152 Later, as Chief Justice of England, Coke continued to 
challenge the royal prerogative by triggering a series of infamous 
jurisdictional disputes that demanded the King’s personal 
intervention. From his seat at the bench, Coke asserted that the 
supremacy of the common law was derived from his perception of 
it as a continuous body of law, handed down and developed since 
the pre-Norman conquest and which was in itself the most accurate 
reflection of the natural law.153 Coke’s views were deliberately 
based upon a distorted adaptation of the history of English common 
law and served him in his personal ambitious plan to undermine the 
authority of James.154 But falsified history does not necessarily 
make a bad argument and Coke’s celebrated opposition to James as 
well as his extremely popular legal writings were an invaluable 
intellectual contribution to the political enemies of King James who 
sought to limit the scope of sovereign authority. More abstractly, 
Coke argued, contrary to both Aristotle and Aquinas, that 
commutative justice ontologically predates any form of distributive 
justice and that the ‘natural’ commutability of common law 
principles is the jurisprudential foundation of any form of positive 
law. 
In the decades that followed, Coke’s persuasive and daring 
assertions came to galvanize the notion that the common law was 
both older and superior to the will of the king and became accepted 
as a historical fact that was merely obscured by the relatively recent 
and constant tyrannical abuse of the Tudor and Stuart Absolute 
monarchs.155 In the broader perspective, Coke was also the first legal 
thinker that established a direct logical connection between the 
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origin of property and the scope of the royal prerogative. This 
logical connection would be further substantiated by John Locke, 
albeit in the context of a more sophisticated theory regarding the 
origin of property.156 
C. Populism and Parliamentary Supremacy 
Shortly after this frontal assault from the Bench, in 1616 Coke 
joined Parliament. Here he united with a group of vocal critics of the 
Crown who espoused similar anti-Absolutist views.157 This group 
would be later known as the Levellers, a political movement that 
emphasized popular sovereignty and the sovereign primacy of 
Parliament and its representatives over the King.158 In 1628, Coke 
and his allies in Parliament introduced the ‘Petition of Right’ as a 
response to Charles I’s attempt to enforce “forced loans” upon the 
members of Parliament in order to finance his military 
expeditions.159 The ‘Petition of Right’ set out in clear and 
unambiguous terms what Coke considered as the pre-existing rights 
of Englishmen to be free from martial law, billeting of soldiers, non-
Parliamentary taxation and imprisonment without cause.160 Charles 
initially rejected the petition but the pressure of Parliament 
ultimately forced him to ratify it. By ratifying the petition, the king 
had to fundamentally acknowledge the existence of a number of 
cardinal individual rights on which he could not infringe and the 
scope of the royal prerogative was greatly reduced.161 In essence, 
the ‘Petition of Right’ can also be seen as the first instance in which 
an official legal document implicitly acknowledged the notion that 
certain common law commutative rights predate and are therefore 
exempt from any form of sovereign distributive intervention. 
In parallel to these legislative efforts, Coke and his fellow pre-
Levellers espoused the view that the ‘Petition of Right’ merely 
reinstated the fundamental rights which were already recognized by 
the Kings of England following the ratification of the Magna 
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Carta.162 Some legal historians described this polemical view as the 
moment in which “The Myth of Magna Carta” was established and 
observed that “It was an age in which historical discoveries were 
received with credulity and in which the canons of historical 
criticism were yet unformulated.”163 The unadulterated mingling of 
politics and faux historical research, although recognized as such by 
many of Coke’s contemporaries, remained largely unchallenged due 
to the mounting popular pressure in Parliament to curtail the deeply 
incompetent King.164 Coke and his supporters not only managed to 
establish The Myth of Magna Carta among their contemporaries, but 
almost surprisingly, the myth itself was perpetuated in later years by 
new waves of jurists and politicians that might have deemed 
themselves more critical and will be examined in the next Sections 
of this Note.165 
This political achievement also brought about a significant shift 
in the perception of property and its relation to sovereignty. Prior to 
the 1640s, property rights were widely conceived as rights that were 
conferred upon individuals by the sovereign.166 But in his polemics, 
Coke made the now infamous assertion that, “A man’s house is his 
castle.”167 This proclamation sought to sever the connection 
between the state and personal property and portrayed the sovereign 
not as the fountainhead of property rights but rather as the most 
significant threat to these rights.168 Essentially, Coke asserted that 
sovereign distributive justice seeks to disrupt and undermine the 
natural tranquility that is the cornerstone of private commutative 
justice. 
D. The End of Royal Control Over Property Rights and Law 
The second stage in the development of the counter Absolutist 
thought emerged during the 1630s and 1640s and was led by 
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political thinkers such as John Milton, Richard Overton, and Henry 
Parker.169 These thinkers represented similar but distinct strands of 
political thought. 
 Milton and Overton adopted a radical ‘populist’ position as part 
of their political association with the Levellers by arguing that the 
seat of ultimate sovereign supremacy must be located with the 
people and not with the king.170 These radical populists argued that 
the source of sovereignty is located with the people of England, or 
the body politic, and that the only form of legitimate government 
was that which was established by popular elections. Thus, they 
subverted the Absolutist head-body metaphor by asserting that it 
was the role of the body to both elect and if necessary reject its head 
through the process of democratic elections.171 
Henry Parker, with his theory of representation, espoused a more 
moderate view that championed the sovereign primacy of 
Parliament over both the king and the common people.172 The 
moderate Parliamentarians also located the source of ultimate 
sovereignty with the people but rejected the argument that elections 
ensured equitable representation. Instead, these thinkers held that 
the best way to promote the interest of the body politic was by 
figurative representation in Parliament. Figurative representation 
meant that the unelected members of Parliament must in their 
actions as members seek to represent the will of the people and strive 
to promote the common welfare of the body politic. This growing 
populist sentiment was ultimately coupled with the Lords’ outrage 
over the King’s taxations and led to the break of the Civil War in 
1642.173 
The aftermath of the Civil War produced a dramatic rift in 
English legal and constitutional landscape. For practical reasons, 
this work will not discuss the tumultuous period of the war itself nor 
the immediate period that led to the Glorious Revolution in great 
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detail. Rather, this Section will briefly focus on the impact of those 
events on England in the decades that followed. 
The years that led up to the Civil War were marked by a 
simultaneous assault upon the royal prerogative. Both the common 
law courts and Parliament laid claim to sovereign supremacy by 
developing competing political theories. These constitutional 
conflicts ultimately resulted in the institution of Parliamentary 
superiority following the Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the 
ratification of the ‘Bill of Rights’ in 1689. The passage of the bill 
significantly limited the scope of the royal prerogative and instituted 
Parliament as the seat of ultimate sovereignty. Although the 
Judiciary Bench failed to secure its primacy in the constitutional 
scheme, the common law courts also achieved significant 
independence from the royal prerogative, even if in truth, the courts 
effectively exchanged one master with another by becoming more 
dependent upon Parliament.174 
All of these remarkable changes also produced a new property 
regime that would have been unrecognizable to a sixteenth century 
Englishmen who lived in the early 1600s. It was no longer the king 
who controlled the dispensation of land and taxation through his 
royal prerogative, but the Parliament that had an ultimate say in 
matters of property. By 1689, it became clear that the source of 
sovereignty and hence distributive justice in England was the 
Parliament. 
III. THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW PROPERTY REGIME 
A. The Property Regime Under Parliamentarian Rule 
As Hannah Arendt has pointed out, prior to the late 17th century 
the word “revolution” was strictly tied to its original astronomical 
meaning, which signified the eternal, irresistible, ever-recurring 
motion of the heavenly bodies.175 As a star that completes its 
revolution around the sun in the same precise place of initial 
departure, when the word was first invoked in the English political 
context during the 1660s— its use was metaphorical and served to 
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describe a movement or a swing back to a pre-ordained order.176 The 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 was therefore envisioned by its 
architects as a reactionary act by which the lawful King of England 
would once again be recognized as the pinnacle of sovereign 
dominion.177 But perhaps ironically, the Glorious Revolution which 
formally intended to restore monarchial power to its former 
righteousness and glory, actually brought about significant 
constitutional changes which would have been practically 
unimaginable to Elizabethan Absolutist observers.178 In fact, the 
Glorious Revolution proved to be much more ‘revolutionary’ from 
the way it was portrayed to the observing public.179 
These changes were most radical and apparent in the field of 
property law. The ‘Bill of Rights’ of 1689 was enacted in order to 
limit the scope of the royal prerogative in property matters.180 The 
Bill restricted the crown’s ability to levy taxes without Parliaments’ 
consent or to impose fines and fortitudes in the absence of due 
process. These limitations were coupled with another significant 
financial constraint upon the Crown. Up until the 1690s, the 
Exchequer issued royal tallies or debts of the crown against future 
tax revenue. These tallies served as sovereign bonds and provided 
the king with liquidity. The issuance of tallies was within the 
exclusive purview of the crown and provided it with a reliable means 
of remaining solvent at times of crisis. The formation of the Bank of 
England in 1694 marked the end of this independent practice and the 
issuance of tallies had to be approved by Parliament.181 These two 
acts serve as the most potent examples of how the crown was 
stripped of any meaningful tool of controlling and regulating 
property in the immediate aftermath of the Glorious Revolution. 
Concurrently, Parliament gained unprecedented control over 
property matters and secured its position as the ultimate authority in 
these affairs.182 But Parliament, which was effectively controlled by 
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the landed gentry and England’s magnets, also sought to limit the 
power of the state to regulate their own property. As a result, both 
the ‘Bill of Rights’ and further legislation in the field of property 
law imposed restrictions on the ability of the sovereign to forfeit 
property absent proper legal process.183 
As in the days of Coke, many of the members of Parliament 
promoted their own financial interest by attempting to galvanize the 
‘sanctity’ of private property.184 In this respect, this political faction 
perceived Locke’s labor theory as a powerful conceptual vehicle 
through which they could support their own self-interest.185 
B. Locke’s Labor Theory 
As mentioned in the introduction, Locke’s theory proved 
extremely helpful in cementing the theoretical justifications for the 
significant changes that took place in the 1690s. In a similar manner 
to the general perception of the Revolution, it was vital for Locke 
that his theory would be accepted as ‘reinstituting’ the English 
system of property to its ‘original’ historical roots.186 In this sense, 
his theory provided a innovative yet ultimately fictitious account of 
property, disguised as a much-needed return to the traditional 
English precepts of property. In his writings, Locke sought to 
reconstruct a myth concerning the formation of English property 
rights and the establishment of the English constitution, much as 
Coke had done 50 years prior.187 
Locke first theorized as to what was the ‘natural’ manner by 
which property is brought about. According to his account, property 
was created through individual labor, whether it be cultivation of 
land, the creation of objects or even hunting.188 To protect their 
property, individuals gradually formed communities or 
governments that utilize the power of the many in providing such 
protections. In Locke’s view, it therefore logically followed that the 
chief duty of any government to provide such protection is to its 
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citizens and that any government which blatantly breached this duty 
was deemed despotic and illegitimate.189 
In his Second Treatise, Locke attempted to demonstrate that this 
natural phenomenon was in fact the actual historical way by which 
the English nation and its common laws were first formed. He 
argued that the Saxon people established the English Crown in order 
to protect their private properties from Nordic invasions and that it 
was the role of the Saxon Kings to protect their subjects from 
wrongful appropriation.190 In his works, Locke further insisted that 
even the Norman conquest of England did not in any way abolish 
the allegedly self-evident and natural property rights of Englishmen 
in their lands and property: 
We are told by some, that the English monarchy is founded in 
the Norman conquest, and that our princes have thereby a title to 
absolute dominion: which if it were true, (as, by history, it appears 
otherwise) and that William had a right to make war on this island; 
yet his dominion by conquest could reach no farther than to the 
Saxons and Britons, that were then inhabitants of England. The 
Normans that came with him, and helped to conquer, and all 
descended from them, are freemen, and no subjects by conquest; let 
that give what dominion it will. And if I, or anybody else, shall claim 
freedom, as derived from them, it will be very hard to prove the 
contrary: and it is plain, the law, that has made no distinction 
between one and the other, intends that there should not be any 
difference in their freedom or privileges.191 
Locke therefore vehemently denied that it was the sovereign 
who was the ultimate owner of all the property in England. Instead 
Locke claimed that, historically he was a mere custodial agent that 
was tasked with guarding and guaranteeing the private rights in 
property of the English people.192 
In addition, due to this fact, Locke concluded that all property 
owners possessed ultimate jurisdiction over their private property 
with only some very narrow exceptions.193 The most notable being 
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that they should not infringe upon the rights of another 
Englishman.194 In his account, however, the limits that are imposed 
upon this private right do not emanate from a centralized sovereign 
decision to promote the rather abstract common good through 
distributive justice. Rather, he argued that any limitation on private 
property emanates from a concrete or potential injury to another 
individual or his property.195 In accordance with this understanding, 
the role of the government in regulating property is therefore limited 
to resolving disputes among private owners of property and 
protecting the rights of citizens from injurious uses of property by 
other individuals.196 More abstractly, the role of the sovereign is 
limited to overseeing the equitable administration of commutative 
justice among the private individuals that are under its dominion.197 
In Locke’s account, the role of distributive justice is entirely 
obscured. It only comes into play in the original allocation of goods 
prior to the formation of the government, that is, in the state of 
nature. Crucially, this understanding leaves very little room for the 
government to regulate private property in light of what it 
determines to be the common good. This is due to the fact that such 
action is distributive and any governmental regulation should only 
be made in light of protecting individual interest and not for the 
“benefit of the community.”198 
In the pragmatic political context, Locke’s theory was utilized 
to introduce new legislation that broadened the private rights of 
citizens in their property and promoted the introduction of new 
privately owned institutions such as the Bank of England.199 For 
example, during the debates surrounding the ‘Four Percent Bill’ of 
1692, Locke was encouraged by Sir John Somers to argue for the 
merits of opposing the Bill which sought to enforce government 
regulation on privately serviced interest rates.200 
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Locke and his fellow Whig reformers in the early years of the 
Hanoverian rule of England were also greatly influenced by the 
Dutch society and wanted to emulate to a great extent this vibrant 
financial center of Europe.201 This political faction that established 
itself as the Whig party in Parliament was deeply disturbed by the 
centralist-authoritarian rule of Louis XIV of France and identified 
his regime as antithetical to their vision of a liberal civic society.202 
Locke and his allies in Parliament envisaged a liberal society 
without legal barriers to the advance of the individual (so long as 
they were Protestant). Their political action was aimed at improving 
domestic and foreign trade and establishing London as a financial 
capital that was free from what they considered as cumbersome and 
corrupt sovereign oversight.203 In addition, they promoted 
legislation that would weaken the grip of the central government 
over trade and commerce by constructing through laws, a political-
economic framework that better resembled the Dutch model of a 
weak central government and robust privately owned 
corporations.204 
The implied ideology that animated all of this vigorous political 
activity was that private wealth was good and could be earned by 
talent and hard work, and that given the right encouragement, 
individuals seeking their own good would create wealth and 
prosperity in this new competitive world. More fundamentally, this 
ideology was bolstered by a theoretical framework that championed 
the primacy of commutative justice and the perceived inherent 
commercial oppression of the absolutist form of distributive justice, 
which was identified as an antiquated scholastic remnant of the Dark 
Ages and their corollary tyrannical feudal regimes.205 Locke not 
only argued for the replacement of the sovereign entity that 
administered distributive justice but also for the supremacy of the 
laws of private commutative justice over the positive laws of the 
willing sovereign whether it be a monarch or a democratically 
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elected parliament.206 Hence, in his eyes Parliament should replace 
the role of the Crown as ultimate sovereign, but nonetheless, 
Parliament’s laws should always be subordinate to the superior 
“self-evident” natural edicts of the common law.207 
C. Copyright Law in the Aftermath of the Civil War and the 
Licensing Acts of the 1690s 
All of these significant shifts in political philosophy and policy 
had a substantial impact upon the London book trade and most 
especially, upon the Stationers’ Company. The first wave of 
parliamentary legislation in the field of copyright was enacted 
during the Restoration Period of the 1670s.208 In the strictest 
technical sense, this legislation simply reinstated the principles and 
rules of the licensing system that existed prior to the eruption of the 
Civil War. However, some significant changes were implemented. 
The new legislation became tied to a stricter censorship regime that 
was enforced in order to silence any perceived opposition to the 
newly instated Catholic Stuart monarchs.209 The Kings of this era, 
Charles II and James II, were deeply influenced by their French 
cousin and ally, King Louis XIV, and their efforts to heavily regulate 
the press were derived to a great extent from their personal ambition 
plan to quell any hint of internal opposition to their Absolute rule.210 
As a result, these new laws imposed a great burden upon the book 
trade. During the 1670s and 1680s, printers and other Stationers’ 
workshops were frequently raided by agents of the Secretary of State 
and many manuscripts were confiscated and seized by order of the 
courts for containing potentially treasonous materials.211 Extreme 
yet relatively frequent cases involving writings which were 
considered by the authorities treasonable, resulted in more severe 
punishment. Some printers were imprisoned and a number of them 
were eventually executed.212 
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The majority of these persecutions were considered as an 
integral part of the overall concerted effort of the Tories in 
Parliament and the King’s Courts to restrict the power of the Whigs 
over the English press. Executions were therefore reserved for those 
pro-Whig printers who sought to publish works that denied the 
legitimacy of King Chalres II’s Catholic rule over England.213 As 
opposed to the flourishing book trade of the tolerant Dutch, the 
English printers found themselves in the midst of a tense and at 
times violent, political conflict that turned their profession into a 
notoriously dangerous one.214 Printers had to be very careful in 
constructing their political alliances and many of them decided for 
political and economic reasons to become loyal to the Tories and 
their Francophile Catholic King. 
The Revolution of 1688 brought about yet another dramatic shift 
in the political balance of England in which the Whigs gained 
complete control of the Crown and the government. Suddenly, the 
Stationers who remained loyal to James II and in particular those 
who were Catholics, were prosecuted by Parliament and the 
courts.215 Some of these printers were imprisoned because they were 
deemed to be radical Jacobites who sought to bring about the return 
of the exiled Stuarts, but none of them were executed.216 Instead, 
Locke and his Whig allies in Parliament attempted to curtail the 
authority of the Stationers’ Company, which they identified as a 
bastion of support to the old Catholic regime.217 
In 1692, the Tory Party in Parliament was nonetheless able to 
pass a Licensing Act with the support of some centrist Whigs.218 The 
Tories were traditional backers of the Stationers’ Company and 
recognized that the Licensing Act was the key legal instrument to 
protect the Company’s commercial interest.219 Surprisingly, the 
centrist Whigs supported this legislation because it also included 
censoring provisions that enabled the Stationers and the courts to 
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regulate the press by weeding out Jacobite members of the trade.220 
But this coalition was fragile and relied upon the partisan 
cooperation of two political factions that were essentially at odds 
with each other.221 
The opposition to the Licensing Act of 1692 was composed from 
the remaining majority of the Whig party in Parliament.222 The 
Whigs opposed the Act for two main reasons. The predominant 
reason was a political one: to limit the commercial and political 
influence of the Stationers Company that they identified as a Tory-
Catholic leaning institution. The second motivation was 
commercial: to break the perpetual monopolistic grip of the 
individual members of the company over the copyrights they held 
in lucrative canonical literary works. Ultimately, all the strong 
opposition to the Bill due to its restricted support, the 1692 Act was 
limited in duration and was set to lapse in 1695.223 
Locke and his followers recognized this political opportunity 
and immediately began to engage in lobbying efforts to ensure that 
the Act would not be renewed without undergoing significant 
alternation. To achieve this goal, Locke and his political allies 
decided to dismantle the coalition that enabled the legislation to pass 
in 1692. They did so by arguing that the matters of censorship and 
copyright are distinct issues and that the Licensing Act should be 
accordingly bifurcated into two separate bills that address both 
matters separately.224 
Without the support of the 1692 coalition, Parliament was 
unable to renew the Act in 1695.225 The Tories failed to gather 
sufficient Whig support to pass a bill that would only address the 
concerns of the members of the Stationers Company.226 Meanwhile, 
the moderate Whigs failed to recruit enough Tory backing to pass 
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legislation that would provide the Hanoverian Whig King with a 
powerful tool to prosecute their historical Catholic allies.227 
Locke himself promoted an alternative copyright bill that would 
greatly diminish the power of the Stationers’ Company, but this bill 
proposal also failed to gain sufficient political traction.228 
Nonetheless, it can be argued that Locke must have been greatly 
satisfied with the outcome of his lobbying efforts. The lapse of the 
Act in 1695 significantly damaged the Stationers’ Company.229 The 
company’s register was no longer a legally binding official data-
base and the Stationers’ century-old control over the regulation of 
copyright in England was greatly diminished. In addition, the lapse 
of the Act had de-facto introduced the notion of ‘free press’ in 
England. Absent a legally sanctioned censoring mechanism, the 
Crown was unable to prosecute or censor printers who were deemed 
politically problematic.230 
In short, the aftermath of the Glorious Revolution also marked 
the end of the historical role of the Stationers’ Company in copyright 
regulation. This end was the result of a significant change in 
sovereign authority which greatly curtailed the scope of the Royal 
prerogative.231 Absent Royal protection, the Company proved to be 
an easy target to its commercial and political rivals. In this context, 
it is also crucial to note that the sovereign changes of the 1680s and 
90s did not produce a better or more efficient copyright regime. 
Instead, the governmental vacuum that was created by the lapse of 
the Licensing Act in 1695 resulted in a fifteen-year period of legal 
and commercial chaos in the field of copyright.232 Without any 
enforceable legal mechanism, pirating was rampant, and the English 
book market collapsed into a disarrayed free-for-all.233 If anything, 
this anarchic period attests to the commercial devastation that 
ensues in the absence of sovereign distributive legal mechanisms.234 
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Even if Locke honestly intended to protect the printers from 
censorship and award authors with adequate compensation, the 
sovereign vacuum of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries produced the opposite result.235 The breakdown of the 
English book trade left the individual printers and authors legally 
exposed and unprotected.236 
D. The Statute of Anne and Its Immediate Implications 
The lapse of the Licensing Act in 1695 had resulted in a great 
depreciation in the political and commercial influence of the 
Stationers’ Company. Without an effective enforcement 
mechanism, the Company’s register was no longer routinely used by 
printers who sought to protect their works.237 Many of the 
Company’s individual members lost a great source of their revenue 
due to pirating and had to limit the amount of copies they printed. 
In addition, the English book market was flooded with cheap book 
copies from the continent which had further damaged domestic 
commerce. The Company made a number of attempts to persuade 
Parliament to act but due to their diminished importance these 
requests were largely disregarded.238 
Nonetheless, during the early years of the 18th century, a 
growing number of renowned authors such as Daniel Defoe and 
Jonathan Swift began lobbying Parliament to enact new laws that 
would protect their writings. Due to their disadvantaged 
circumstance, the Stationers made a strategic decision to join this 
effort and also argued that author’s works should receive 
governmental protection.239 Thus, this newly formed coalition was 
in essence, a union of two historic commercial adversaries under one 
cause. But more importantly, it signaled a fundamental change in 
the Stationers position concerning copyright law.240 First, due to 
their diminished political influence the Stationers conceded that any 
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form of legislation should primarily protect the rights of authors and 
not of printers, as legislation in the field historically did.241 Second, 
they cleverly framed this sovereign protection as stemming from the 
Lockean principles of the labor theory of property and not as 
emanating from the rights that were historically bestowed upon 
them by the king over the ownership of copies.242 In other words, to 
promote their short-termed commercial interest, the members of the 
Stationers Company came to reject the primacy of the rights of 
printers according to the old distributive regime and based their 
claims upon the commutative principles of commensurate exchange. 
This position ultimately alsovundermined their rightful claim to the 
copies of the canonical works they traditionally held, but nontheless 
it seems that this was a concession they were willing to make in 
order to revive their threatened enterprise.243 Finally, the Stationers 
supported the authors argument that legislation in the field is 
necessary to promote the general welfare of the reading public and 
abandoned the traditional position that it was necessary in order to 
regulate the commercial field of book printing.244 All of these 
concessions were made by necessity and reflect a rather desperate 
attempt to restore some sort of order to their threatened trade. 
After years of mounting pressure, the Copyright Act of 1710 was 
enacted in April of that year. The Act contained a number of 
important provisions. First, it sought to curtail the dissemination of 
unlicensed and foreign books. Second, it was framed as “An Act for 
the Encouragement of Learning.” Third, the Act transferred the right 
in copies from the Stationers to the authors of the works. Fourth, it 
limited the role of the Stationers’ Company: matters of pirating or 
infringement were no longer under the jurisdiction of the company 
but rather under the sole supervision of the courts.245 Finally, the Act 
set a time limit on the protection that was afforded to new copies 
and foreclosed the right to own copy rights in perpetuity. To reward 
the Stationers for all the concessions they were willing to make, a 
provision was made to protect the copies that were historically held 
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by the company for an additional period of 21 years after which 
these once perpetual rights would fall into the public domain.246 
The Copyright Act of 1710 can be seen as a piece of legislation 
that reconciled the interests of the Authors and the Stationers’ 
Company. The majority of the provisions in the Act manifested 
Locke’s principles of the labor theory of property. The property 
itself, referring to the written works, is created by the individual 
author independently of any government intervention. Therefore, 
the role of the legislation can be seen as regulating the actual 
protection of this private property from wrongful usurpation for a 
limited time.247 It is important to note that the Act did not clearly 
distinguish between the protection of the tangible manuscript itself 
and the intangible right over the circulation of copies of the 
manuscript.248 
However, the Act itself also contains two other provisions that 
can be identified as stemming from a more traditional and 
distributive understanding of property. In this sense, the Act can be 
viewed as an ‘amphibious’ creature of the law. The first element that 
manifests the hybridity of the Act is the section that states that the 
law is enacted as “An Act for the Encouragement of Learning.” The 
second element is of course the imposition of a limitation on the 
time for which the copyright protection would be granted.249 Both 
provisions contain traces of the traditional property maxim that 
asserts that property is a positive right which is conferred by the 
sovereign and establishes a legal relationship between an individual 
and a legally recognized object. 
Most importantly, the Act de facto rejected the Lockean proviso 
concerning the imposition of limitations upon the possession of 
private property. The ‘limited duration’ provision of the Act does 
not stem from a concern for rights of other private individuals but in 
order to promote the common good. In other words, the limitation is 
imposed in accordance with the principles of ‘distributive’ and not 
‘commutative’ justice. Although the Act adopted some of Locke’s 
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language and also his views about the rights of authors in their 
works, it outright rejected his theory of property. 
The aftermath of the legislation marked a turning point for the 
English book trade. New and more independent printers were able 
to enter the market and the general situation of authors greatly 
improved.250 The Stationers’ Company however, never returned to 
its former glory and the registration of copies in the Company’s 
Register did not increase in a significant way after the legislation 
was enacted. Instead, the members of the Company found some 
comfort in their renewed ability to control the printing of registered 
classic works due to their historic exclusive rights in them. 
Ultimately, the Statute expired in 1732 and led to the outbreak of 
the “Battle of the Booksellers,” a second period of legal uncertainty 
that was to last until the end of the 1770s and is discussed in greater 
detail in Section III.E.251 
E. Blackstone’s Conception of Intellectual Property 
To fully understand Blackstone’s conception of intellectual 
property it is essential to briefly trace the theoretical influences that 
shaped his legal opinion. First, as many other eminent jurors of the 
age, Blackstone was deeply influenced by Coke’s theory of the 
common law and considered himself a staunch proponent of his 
thinking.252 Blackstone supported the notion that common law was 
based on custom, adopted voluntarily by the people of Britain and 
predated the English monarchy.253 In addition, Blackstone echoed 
Coke’s assertion that the common law is the most accurate reflection 
of the natural law.254 This led him to declare that these common law 
rights are “natural” in the legal sense and therefore cannot be 
abrogated by the sovereign.255 
Second, Blackstone supported Henry Parker’s position in 
relation to Parliament’s supremacy. As part of this position, 
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Blackstone maintained the view that Parliament was the seat of 
ultimate sovereignty in England and that any law or judgment must 
be executed only upon Parliament’s approval.256 This view of 
Parliament was most popular amongst the English elite of that age. 
In this context, it is crucial to note that as a supporter of Parker’s 
views of representation, Blackstone was by no means a populist and 
he had out rightly rejected the populist notion of popular 
representation.257 
Third, in the field of property, Blackstone generally adopted 
Locke’s views by embracing his labor theory. As noted in Section 
II.F, Locke’s theory fit rather neatly with Coke’s views on 
sovereignty. In relation to the field of copyrights in particular, 
Blackstone agreed with Locke that authors create their literary 
works through labor and that it is the role of governments to protect 
this form of intellectual property.258 
At first glance, it seems that these three main propositions are 
internally consistent and co-exist rather harmoniously but in fact, 
they will prove to be contradictory and ultimately irreconcilable. 
James Wilson, one of the founding fathers of the United States and 
a renowned legal theorist, summed up Blackstone’s theoretical 
inconsistencies in a precise manner: 
“It is one of the characteristick marks of English 
liberty,” says he [Blackstone], “that our common law 
depends upon custom, which carries this internal 
evidence of freedom along with it, that it probably 
was introduced by the voluntary consent of the 
people.” I search not for contradictions: I wish to 
reconcile what is seemingly contradictory. But, if the 
common law could be introduced, as it is admitted it 
probably was, by the voluntary consent of the people; 
I confess I cannot reconcile with this—certainly a 
solid—principle, the principle that “A law always 
supposes some superior, who is to make it,” nor 
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another principle, that “sovereignty and legislature 
are indeed convertible terms.”259 
In this passage, Wilson respectfully points out to the fundamental 
flaw in Blackstone’s view of the law and sovereignty. He observes 
initially that Blackstone is a proponent of Coke and asserted the 
‘naturalness’ and superiority of the common law. But he also 
demonstrates that at the same time, Blackstone argued for the 
supremacy of Parliament as the source and fountainhead of all laws. 
In other words, in his theoretical writings Blackstone introduces a 
conflict of laws and it is impossible to determine which of the two 
sources of law, Parliament or the common law should prevail in the 
case of any direct contradiction.260 
Therefore, and perhaps unsurprisingly, it was this abstract and 
theoretical conflict regarding notions of legal supremacy that 
produced Blackstone’s confusing position on intellectual property 
law which guided his actions during the great legal conflict that later 
came to be known as the ‘Battle of the Booksellers.’ This notorious 
and long-lasting legal conflict involved two factions of the book 
market that represented two competing commercial interests. One 
faction included established members of the Stationers’ Company 
and authors who licensed their works to those printers.261 The 
opposing side consisted of a rapidly growing number of independent 
printers which had printed works that had ‘fallen’ into the public 
domain in accordance with the 1710 Act.262 The Stationers’ faction 
argued that the original authors of the works had a ‘natural’ and 
perpetual common law right in their labor and that the provision in 
the 1710 Act, which secured their rights for a limited period of 14 
years, was violating this right. The independent printers argued that 
the Act did not violate any such right and that they were fully 
empowered to print these works in light of the statute.263 
During the 1760s, Blackstone became actively involved in the 
dispute as a barrister for the Stationers’ faction. In 1769, he 
submitted the written argument on behalf of his client Millar, a 
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wildly affluent Scottish publisher, in the case of Millar v. Taylor.264 
Millar was extremely litigious and was a plaintiff in a number of 
litigations concerning the matter of copyright protection during the 
1750s and 60s. The gist of Blackstone’s argument in the case was 
summed up by the court: 
The Plaintiff insisted that there is a real property 
remaining in authors, after publication of their works 
and that they only, or those who claim under them 
[licensed publishers], have a right to multiply the 
copies of their literary property, and their pleasure, 
for sale. And they likewise insisted, that this right is 
a common law right, which always has existed, and 
does still exist, independent of and not taken away by 
the statute of 8 Anne c.19.265 
In terms of sovereignty theory, this argument asserted the primacy 
of the common law over the positive law of Parliament and the 
superiority of ‘natural’ common law rights over positive rights that 
are conferred by legislation.266 In contrary to the conflicting position 
that was apparent in his writings upon the nature of English 
sovereignty, as a barrister, Blackstone clearly advocated for the 
supremacy of the common law over the positive laws of 
government. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, the court in the case ruled in favor of the 
Plaintiff Millar. In his majority opinion, Sir Richard Aston directly 
quoted a passage from Locke and concluded that: 
[A] Man may have Property in his Body, Life, Fame, 
Labours, and the like; and, in short, in anything that 
can be called His: That it is incompatible with the 
Peace and Happiness of Mankind, to violate or 
disturb, by Force or Fraud, his Possession, Use or 
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Disposal of those Rights; as well as against the 
Principles of Reason, Justice, and Truth.267 
Lord Mansfield, who previously served as counsel for another 
copyright-holding publisher, filed a separate concurring opinion that 
also asserted the supremacy of the common law and stated that 
“what is agreeable to the natural principles is common-law; what is 
repugnant to natural principles is contrary to common law” and 
concluded that “ . . . it is agreeable to natural principles that an 
author should have a copy of his own works . . .”268 
Interestingly, Sir Joseph Yates, the sole dissenter in the case, did 
not reject the constitutional or sovereign principle that underlined 
the legal theory that was presented by Blackstone. Instead, he 
merely disagreed with the plaintiff’s assertion that the Act actually 
violated the ‘natural’ and common law right of authors in their 
works.269 In his dissenting opinion, Yates argued that while an 
author does have natural rights in his works, he voluntarily forfeits 
those rights to the world if he publishes the work and benefits from 
the protection of the law. His opinion was also based on Locke’s 
theory of property, but it took into consideration Locke’s proviso 
that whilst individuals have a right to private property from nature 
by working on it, they can do so only “at least where there is enough, 
and as good, left in common for others”270: 
Shall an Author’s Claim continue, without Bounds of 
Limitation; and for ever restrain all the Rest of 
Mankind from their natural rights, by an endless 
Monopoly? Yet such is the claim that is now made; 
a Claim to an exclusive Right of Publication, for 
ever: For, nothing less is demanded as a Reward and 
Fruit of the Author’s Labour, than an absolute 
Perpetuity.271 
Through his vigorous advocacy, Blackstone secured a 
significant victory for the established publishers of London and for 
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English authors in general.272 But in the wider context, Millar v. 
Taylor can also be seen as a remarkable victory for the proponents 
of the supremacy of the common law and attest to the potency of the 
‘Myth of the Common Law’ which was first conceived by Coke 
more than 150 years prior to this decision. It is impossible to discern 
whether Blackstone’s advocacy was entirely motivated by his sense 
of justice or from political expediency but it is clear that despite his 
inability to reconcile the theoretical gap in his writings concerning 
this conflict of laws, he was unhesitant to promote a persuasive legal 
theory that clearly favored the common law. 
F. The Demise of Common Law Copyright in England 
Despite its decisiveness, the precedent set by Millar v. Taylor 
lasted for less than five years. In February 1774, the case which was 
heard at the Court of Chancery was appealed to the House of Lords 
that also served as the court of final appeal.273 The twelve judges 
that heard the case were asked to determine five questions: (1) 
“Whether, at common law, an author of any book or literary 
composition, had the sole right of first printing and publishing the 
same for sale, and might bring an action against any person who 
printed, published, and sold the same, without his consent?” (2) “If 
the author had such right originally, did the law take it away upon 
his printing and publishing such book or literary composition, and 
might any person afterward reprint and sell, for his own benefit, such 
book or literary composition, against the will of the author?” (3) “If 
such action would have lain at common law, is it taken away by the 
statute of 8th Anne: and is an author, by the said statute, precluded 
from every remedy except on the foundation of the said statute, and 
on the terms and conditions prescribed thereby?” (4) ”Whether the 
author of any literary composition, and his assigns, had the sole right 
of printing and publishing the same, in perpetuity, by the common 
law?” and (5) “Whether this right is any way impeached, restrained, 
or taken away, by the statute 8th Anne?”274 
In the most abstract sense, questions (1), (2), and (4) concerned 
the nature of books and literary works as property, while questions 
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(3) and (5) were constitutional questions that concerned the 
supremacy of positive statutory law. 
Despite his apparent conflict of interest, Blackstone decided not 
to recuse himself and served as one of the judges that opined in the 
case and found in favor of the plaintiff, in accordance with his 
previous advocated position in the lower court.275 In essence, 
Blackstone reaffirmed the constitutional principle that the common 
law is supreme and therefore should preempt any positive law that 
directly contradicted it.276 With regard to the nature of copyright 
property, Blackstone reiterated his position that any book or literary 
composition constitutes common law property. In light of these two 
assertions, Blackstone concluded that the Statute of Anne 
unlawfully usurped the right of authors in the works in question.277 
However, Blackstone’s view was the minority opinion in the 
case. Both the majority of the twelve judges, as well as the House of 
Lords, ruled in favor of the defendant in the case.278 The majority of 
the judges in the case did not submit a uniform opinion and some of 
the majority judges disagreed about the correct answers in response 
to the five questions presented. Nonetheless, two of the opinions, 
those of Lord Chief Justice De Grey and Lord Camden, are of 
particular interest. 
Lord Chief Justice De Grey found that although a common law 
property right existed over the tangible manuscript produced by the 
author, this common law right did not extend as far as to protect any 
additional intangible right in subsequent printed works produced in 
accordance with the original manuscript.279 In addition, De Grey 
found that at any rate, the positive law of Parliament was supreme 
and that it legitimately abrogated any preexisting ‘natural’ or 
common law right. Interestingly, similar to Blackstone’s, De Grey’s 
analysis concerning the nature of books and literary works was 
Lockean in its nature.280 He concluded that manuscripts are tangible 
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objects that should be awarded the protection of the common law. 
But since Locke never settled the question of whether the legal status 
of intangible and tangible objects was the same, De Grey and 
Blackstone interpretations of Locke’s labor theory differed in 
respect to this question. In addition, De Grey conducted an extensive 
historical research to determine whether a common law right in 
books or literary works ever existed in England.281 In his opinion, 
De Grey concluded that: 
What is common law now, must have been so 300 
years ago, when printing was invented. No traces of 
such a claim are to be met with prior to the 
Restoration. Very few cases of this kind happened in 
Charles 2d’s time, or before the licensing act, and 
those few were determined upon the prerogative 
right of the crown. The executive power of the crown 
drew after it this prerogative right, which extended to 
all acts of parliament, matters of religion, and acts of 
state.282 
De Grey’s legal research was commendable and can be said to 
withstand the test of time. However, his interpretation of this legal 
history sheds light on the way Locke’s conception of property 
became so pervasive by the end of the 18th century that it obscured 
any other understanding of the fundamental concept of property. De 
Grey’s analysis failed to recognize that a royal prerogative right 
was, in fact, the sovereign juridical mechanism by which property 
was legally constructed and ultimately realized in pre-Civil War 
England. In other words, no common law right existed in books 
since property itself was not conceived as a creature of the common 
law, but rather a right that was conferred by the sovereign. 
This exact distinction concerning the legal construction of 
property that De Gray faild to observe in his opinion was brilliantly 
summarized by Thomas Hobbes during the Civil War: 
And you cannot deny but there must be law-makers, 
before there were any laws, and consequently before 
there was any justice, (I speak of human justice); and 
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that law-makers were before that which you call 
own, or property of goods or lands, distinguished by 
meum, tuum, alienum . . . You see then that no 
private man can claim a propriety in any lands, or 
other goods, from any title from any man but the 
King, or them that have the sovereign power; 
because it is in virtue of the sovereignty, that every 
man may not enter into and possess what he pleaseth; 
and consequently to deny the sovereign anything 
necessary to the sustaining of his sovereign power, is 
to destroy the propriety he pretends to.283 
As this Note already demonstrated, prior to the Civil War no 
juridical distinction had to be made between royal grants and private 
property. In fact, from a strict legal perspective, these two terms 
were indistinguishable. It is unsurprising that in his extensive 
research De Grey found that these historical decisions “[do] not say 
a word of property.”284 
Most importantly, it is once again crucial to note that these two 
different definitions of property bare significant implications on the 
understanding of sovereignty. In his research, De Grey directly 
encountered the legal argument that “property [is] founded on [the 
royal] prerogative,” but concluded that such an argument “however 
allowable for counsel, [is] not very admissible by, or intelligible to, 
a judge.”285 It is possible to argue that De Grey’s remarks in this 
context were not honest, and that the Lord Chief Justice was well 
aware of the historical legal validity of this argument. In other 
words, he well understood that accepting this prerogative based 
argument as valid would undermine the prevailing constitutional 
understanding of property. This, in turn, would imply that the seat 
of ultimate sovereignty is after all the Crown and not Parliament or 
the courts. However, this possible explanation is merely speculative 
and it is more likely that De Grey was not entirely familiar with the 
nature of the pre-Civil War legal scheme. 
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Much has been written in recent years about this case and about 
the role of the common law in the regulation of intellectual property 
in 18th century England.286 A number of the scholars that have 
researched the case and its history are divided upon the question of 
whether the House of Lords decided that a common law right in 
intangible works of intellectual property existed historically. It 
might be the case that a definitive answer to this question would 
never be found but it is unquestionable that the House of Lords 
decided that regardless of whether such a common law right existed, 
the positive law of Parliament abrogated it. 
In addition, this Note seeks to establish that the question of 
whether the House of Lords found that such a right ‘existed’ and the 
question of whether such a right actually historically existed are two 
important but ultimately separate questions.287 In this context, this 
Note suggests that such a common law right surely did not exist 
prior to the Civil War and probably did not exist prior to the 
publication of Locke’s Second Treaties in 1689. Given the 
circumstances, it is also reasonable to speculate that both Blackstone 
and the plaintiff in the case did not have direct historical evidence 
such as court records or decisions that indicated the actual existence 
of such a right prior to the Glorious Revolution. They instead relied 
upon a more equitable argument that was based upon the persuasive 
ideology of Coke, Locke, and their theoretical successors. But, in 
fact, Lord Camden’s opinion in the case makes clear that at least 
some of the Lord’s were familiar with the pre-revolution legal 
scheme: 
The arguments attempted to be maintained on the 
side of the respondents, were founded on patents, 
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privileges, Star Chamber decrees, and the bye [sic] 
laws of the Stationers’ Company; all of them the 
effects of the grossest tyranny and usurpation; the 
very last places in which I should have dreamt of 
finding the least trace of the common law of this 
kingdom; and yet, by a variety of subtle reasoning 
and metaphysical refinements, have they 
endeavoured to squeeze out the spirit of the common 
law from premises in which it could not possibly 
have existence.288 
If anything, it seems that Camden and his fellows were willing 
to accept or were capable of understanding the historical origin of 
intellectual property in England. It demonstrates that the political 
circumstance of this given era had narrowed their ability appreciate 
or sanction the underlying legal principles of a previous 
constitutional scheme. Simply put, the jurists of the late 18th century 
conceived of their intellectual heritage as antithetical to their own 
ideological beliefs. As a result, they simply rejected those legal 
principles that shaped the sovereign theory and the legal scheme that 
existed in England in the decades that led to the Civil War. 
Nonetheless, the case clearly established that even if a common 
law right in books or literary works existed historically, the Statute 
of Anne has rendered this right irrelevant.289 The case therefore can 
be seen as a clear triumph of Parliament’s supremacy over the 
common law, but also as a moment of extreme dissonance between 
legal practice and theory. 
Provided with this historical survey, it is now possible to answer 
the questions that were presented to the House of Lord’s in the case: 
(1) Prior to the Civil War, authors did not possess a copyright in 
their literary works; instead, printers were conferred with this right 
by a sovereign act of distributive justice and were entitled to protect 
these rights in the courts of common law. (2) Prior to the Civil War, 
authors could sell their manuscripts to members of the Stationers’ 
Company in accordance with the laws of commutative commercial 
exchanges but they had no legal authority to reprint, sell or to 
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prohibit these actions after they have sold their work. (3) Parliament 
as the supreme and ultimate seat of sovereignty, had the authority to 
abolish the distributive regime that was instituted by Queen Mary 
and replace it with another (i.e. the Statute of Anne). (4) Historically, 
authors had no printing rights but members of the Stationers’ 
Company were vested by the prerogative with the sole right of 
printing, publishing or distributing copies in perpetuity and they 
were entitled to enforce this right in the courts of the common law. 
(5) Finally, the historical rights that were conferred upon the 
members of the company was indeed “impeached, restrained, or 
taken away” by the subsequent Statute of Anne.290 
CONCLUSION 
Initially, this Note applied Locke’s labor theory to the AIA’s 
first-inventor-to-file legal scheme. This attempted application has 
revealed the inability of the theory to adequately explain the 
animating principles of our prevailing patent jurisprudence. A short 
historical survey demonstrated that in its origins, intellectual 
property law had functioned in harmony alongside the 
contemporaneous legal theory. For political reasons during the 17th 
century, the system was first disturbed by practical political reforms 
and later was itself theoretically reformed by John Locke. These 
reformers denied the ability of the king to decide who can create and 
own intellectual property. They also questioned the ability of any 
sovereign government to select who should be granted property 
rights. Locke’s new theory perceived property as a creation of 
individual labor and deemed the process of private property 
accumulation as reflective of personal merit. However romantic this 
tale might sound, it simply did not represent the actual pre-existing 
legal scheme that was historically constructed according to an 
antithetical legal architecture. Perhaps surprisingly, the original 
architecture of that legal system still governs our laws and to 
generate any type of meaningful legal reforms in the field, we must 
first come to terms with the inability of our prevailing ideology to 
describe actual legal practice. 
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